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RESOURCE EXTRACTION CONTRACTS UNDER THREAT OF
EXPROPRIATION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
Johannes Stroebel and Arthur van Benthem*
Abstract—We use fiscal data on 2,468 oil extraction agreements in 38 coun-
tries to study tax contracts between resource-rich countries and independent
oil companies. We analyze why expropriations occur and what determines
the degree of oil price exposure of host countries. With asymmetric infor-
mation about a country’s expropriation cost, even optimal contracts feature
expropriations. Near linearity in the oil price of real-world hydrocarbon con-
tracts also helps to explain expropriations. We show theoretically and verify
empirically that oil price insurance provided by tax contracts is increasing in
a country’s cost of expropriation and decreasing in its production expertise.
The timing of actual expropriations is consistent with our model.
I. Introduction
THE sharp increase in the oil price between 2003 and2008 brought back a phenomenon commonly observed
in the 1960s and 1970s: countries expropriating assets
of independent oil companies (IOCs) or surprising them
with large windfall taxes. Countries with recent expropria-
tions include Algeria (2006), Bolivia (2006), China (2006),
Ecuador (2007), Russia (2006, 2007), and Venezuela (2001,
2006, 2007). The subsequent collapse of the oil price empha-
sized how exposed many producing countries are to oil price
fluctuations. Government budgets were slashed in response
to the lower oil price. Gabon’s government, for example,
had to cut its 2009 budget by 13%. Similarly sizable bud-
get cuts happened in Algeria, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, and
other countries.
Resource-rich countries and IOCs negotiate contracts that
specify future tax payments that the company will make to
the host country in exchange for the right to produce hydro-
carbons. In addition to operational expertise, these contracts
could in principle provide a country with valuable insurance
against oil price risk.1 At low oil prices, the country receives
positive tax payments from what may have otherwise been
an unprofitable project. At high prices, the IOC will request
a share of the profits in return.
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1 Alternative insurance mechanisms, such as oil stabilization funds,
explicit fiscal rules, and futures markets, are likely to be less effective than
insurance through IOCs (see appendix A for details).
With full commitment on part of the country, a risk-neutral
IOC would optimally assume all the oil price risk. However,
if commitment is limited, this full-insurance contract gener-
ates large incentives for the country to expropriate at high
oil prices.2 With complete information about the country’s
cost of reneging, the optimal contract will avoid all expro-
priations (Kocherlakota, 1996; Ljungqvist & Sargent, 2004).
The lower the costs of expropriation, the less price insurance
can be provided by the IOC: contracts with countries that
cannot credibly commit to honoring the agreed terms involve
higher payments to the government when the resource price
is high, reducing the incentives to expropriate. To keep the
expected value of the contract to the IOC unchanged, such
tax contracts also involve lower payments to the government
when the resource price is low and the incentive to renege
is limited. This means that countries that suffer from a lack
of commitment carry most of the resource price risk. Herein
lies the trade-off between insurance and expropriation. This
motivates the main questions of this paper. First, if optimal
contracts respond to expropriation incentives, why do expro-
priations occur in practice? Second, what determines how
much price insurance a country can obtain by contracting
with a foreign company?
These are important questions for at least two rea-
sons. First, expropriations entail significant economic losses,
including those from reduced foreign investment and reduced
production efficiency, as well as time and legal costs from
arbitration procedures. Second, exposure to oil price volatility
can greatly disrupt a government’s operations and planning
ability.3 Understanding why expropriations occur and what
determines the degree of price insurance in hydrocarbon tax
contracts can shed light on how to possibly avoid these costs
in the future.
We address our two main questions using a highly detailed
data set of fiscal terms between countries and companies for
a large number of hydrocarbon fields, embedded in a tax
simulator. First, we analyze real-world contracts to establish
that despite a myriad of different taxes, the resulting profile
2 In practice, expropriations can take on a number of forms, from the
outright expropriation of the oil company’s invested capital (as was the case
in Bolivia and Venezuela) to partial expropriation by increasing government
take through taxes or by changing the revenue division rule. For example,
Russia forced Shell to reduce its share in the Sakhalin field from 55% to
27.5% for $7.5 billion in 2006, which was considered deeply below market
value.
3 This welfare cost is particularly large for countries in which hydrocarbon
revenues constitute a large share of the government’s budget. In the period
2000–2007, 72% of Algeria’s, 73% of Congo-Brazzaville’s, and 77% of
Equatorial Guinea’s government revenues were hydrocarbon related (Boad-
way & Keen, 2009). Had the oil price in 2005 been 1 standard deviation
lower, the average fiscal balance of oil-producing countries in a sample
studied by the IMF would have been nearly 10 percentage points of GDP
lower, and about half of the countries would have recorded overall fiscal
deficits (International Monetary Fund, 2007).
The Review of Economics and Statistics, December 2013, 95(5): 1622–1639
© 2013 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
RESOURCE EXTRACTION CONTRACTS UNDER THREAT OF EXPROPRIATION 1623
of tax payments from IOCs to the government can be closely
approximated by a linear function of the oil price. The reason
is that tax terms rarely condition explicitly on the oil price,
but instead are functions of variables such as revenue and
production. Since these are either independent of or rise lin-
early with the oil price, total tax revenues increase linearly in
the oil price. When nonlinear taxes are present, they usually
play a minor role in practice.
Second, we set up a model to solve for the optimal hydro-
carbon contract. In this model, countries want and IOCs can
provide oil price insurance and operational expertise. We then
show that unlike in the complete information model discussed
above, incomplete information about a country’s expropria-
tion cost leads to an optimal contract in which expropriations
may occur with positive probability. If true expropriation
costs cannot be verified, it may be optimal to accept expro-
priations for low realizations of the expropriation cost, if
this allows the provision of more insurance at other real-
izations of this cost. The optimal contract now trades off the
benefits of insurance against the cost of expropriation. Expro-
priations are endogenous and occur whenever the country’s
direct benefits from reneging on the contract exceed the cost
of expropriation. This happens at high oil prices or when
expropriation costs are low. We then restrict our attention
to the linear tax contracts that we observe in practice. This
allows us to derive a number of further predictions: the model
shows that the empirical reality of linear contracts can lead to
additional expropriations at high oil prices. This completes
the answer to the first main question: expropriations may be
inevitable in an optimal contract, but also can occur at high
oil prices due to the near linearity of real-world contracts. The
model also predicts that expropriations are more likely at high
oil prices, in countries with high local hydrocarbon produc-
tion expertise, and in countries with low expropriation costs.
We test these predictions empirically and find statistically
significant evidence for them.
To address the second main question regarding the deter-
minants of how much price insurance a country can obtain,
we use the model to generate further predictions about con-
tract structure. These predictions are independent of whether
we impose linearity. First, insurance in hydrocarbon con-
tracts is higher for countries for which the direct costs of
expropriation are higher. Second, countries that are more
efficient at hydrocarbon production will obtain less insur-
ance. We empirically test these implications. To do this, we
use the hydrocarbon tax simulator and data on expropriation
costs, hydrocarbon production, and GDP for 2,468 contracts
in 38 countries to run regressions analyzing the degree of
contract insurance. We find that the observed structure of
hydrocarbon contracts is highly consistent with the model’s
predictions. The model also predicts that decreasing hydro-
carbon dependence and increasing per capita GDP have two
opposing effects on contract insurance: the immediate ben-
efit of expropriation decreases, but the cost of punishment
(autarky) also declines. We find empirical evidence that the
immediate effect dominates for the countries in our sample.
The results thus provide suggestive evidence that proxies
for the cost of expropriation (the strength of domestic legal
institutions, reliance on foreign direct investment and hydro-
carbon production expertise), dependence on hydrocarbons,
and per capita GDP are important drivers of insurance in
hydrocarbon contracts.
The remainder of this paper proceeds first with a litera-
ture review. In section III, we analyze important properties
of real-world hydrocarbon tax contracts. Section IV presents
a model for the optimal hydrocarbon contract and its com-
parative statics. Section V describes the data employed, and
section VI empirically tests the model implications. The final
section concludes.
II. Literature Review
The first main question of this paper is: Why do expropria-
tions occur in practice? Earlier literature has shown that with
optimal contracts and complete information, costly expropri-
ations will never happen in equilibrium (Thomas & Worrall,
1994; Ljungqvist & Sargent, 2004). The contract structure
in these models responds to parties’ incentives to renege
and eliminates expropriations in all states of the world. We
build on these seminal models and show how the introduction
of asymmetric information about the cost of expropriations
can lead to expropriations on the equilibrium path. Other
models assume an exogenous probability of expropriation,
which is not directly derived from a country’s utility maxi-
mization problem. For example, Engel and Fischer (2010)
assume an exogenous probability of expropriation that is
increasing in project profits. Aghion and Quesada (2010)
use the assumption of a fixed probability of expropriation. In
Rigobon (2010), expropriations occur when company profits
exceed an exogenously set benchmark.
Rather than assuming expropriations, to understand their
occurrence it helps to endogenize such events so that they
result from rational economic behavior. Guriev, Kolotilin,
and Sonin (2011) provide a model with risk-neutral agents in
which expropriations occur in equilibrium, resulting from the
assumption that both the government and the IOC can renege,
the latter by choosing to retain all revenues in a given period
without paying taxes. Therefore, taxes cannot be too high,
which generates expropriations at high oil prices. In reality,
however, IOCs do not typically renege on fiscal agreements.
In our model, expropriations result from a risk-averse govern-
ment reneging on a contract that provides valuable insurance
at low oil prices. Expropriations are the result of rational deci-
sion making and occur because of asymmetric information
with respect to a country’s expropriation costs and because
of the linearity of real-world contracts.
Another large literature has focused on the effect of taxa-
tion on investment incentives, abstracting from the possibility
of expropriation. Taxes may affect the decision to invest
in exploration, development, and extraction of hydrocarbon
resources, as well as the incentives for enhanced recovery
and shutdown. Deacon (1994) shows that corporate income
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taxes barely distort drilling and production, while produc-
tion and property taxes decrease lifetime production by a
limited amount (4.8% to 6.5% in his simulations). Kunce
et al. (2003) find that oil production is highly inelastic with
respect to changes in production taxation. Blake and Roberts
(2006) find slightly higher distortionary effects of taxation
on investment, although the results are sensitive to parame-
terization. Moreover, they find that progressive taxation leads
to larger distortions. This paper follows Rigobon (2010) and
others by abstracting from investment incentives as a first
step toward understanding the optimal contract. We solve
for the optimal contract conditional on a field being opera-
tional and focus on the effect of oil price risk on contract
structure. A theoretical literature has begun to address this
question, but we are not aware of any existing empirical
work.
Rigobon (2010) concludes that the optimal contract choice
will involve partial insurance for a risk-averse government. In
his model, a government chooses between nondistortionary
but volatile income taxes and distortionary but less volatile
royalties. The trade-off between distortions and volatility
results in a partial risk transfer from the government to the
IOC. Aghion and Quesada (2010) analyze a model in which
production depends on unobservable effort on the part of the
IOC. The first-best contract involves constant payments to
the government, with the IOC being the residual claimant to
ensure full effort. Insurance is irrelevant in this model, since
both the IOC and the country are risk neutral.
Engel and Fischer (2010) argue that (exogenous) expro-
priations involve a social cost (for example, from legal
procedures) that is increasing in the present value of the
project. They find that the optimal contract avoids states with
a high probability of expropriation by making the government
the residual claimant on project cash flows in high-revenue
states. Again, the risk neutrality of the government makes
insurance irrelevant in this model.
Previous papers’ common assumption of a risk-neutral
government removes the value of oil price insurance to the
host country. However, there exists extensive evidence that
governments have an incentive to reduce revenue volatility.
Rigobon does analyze risk sharing in optimal contracts. His
approach, in line with the existing literature, is theoretical
or simulation based, since “trying to design the optimal con-
tracts by looking at the actual clauses is an impossible task”
because there are “far too many dimensions to consider”
(Rigobon, 2010). This paper provides a first step toward
closing this empirical gap by analyzing the degree of risk
sharing in real-world contracts. Existing papers have also
not addressed the question of why contract structure varies
so widely by country. This paper builds on Rigobon’s work
by making explicit how the risk transfer in an optimal con-
tract is determined by various country-specific factors. We
then empirically estimate the magnitude of each factor’s
impact using detailed real-world contract data. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first empirical test of an optimal
resource taxation model.
III. Real-World Hydrocarbon Contracts
Real-world hydrocarbon contracts are complicated combi-
nations of taxes on production (often in the form of production
sharing agreements), revenue, profits, and “windfall prof-
its.” As an example, consider the tax structure in Egypt. Tax
terms vary widely by field and company and over time. Taxes
include royalties (negotiable, and varying with location and
production rates, but typically between 45% and 63.75% of
total production), petroleum revenue taxes (generally 10%),
bonuses (fixed annual payments to the government, depend-
ing on the level of production as well as “signature bonuses” at
the start of new exploration activities), and corporate income
taxes (40%). In addition, companies can carry forward any
losses to future tax years (WoodMackenzie, 2009).
A. The Tax Simulator
Determining the total tax payments from the IOC to the
government is an involved task. We obtained a large fiscal
terms data set for hydrocarbon projects, provided generously
by the energy consulting firm WoodMackenzie. This data
set, consisting of WoodMackenzie’s unique and proprietary
data, covers current and historical tax information for 1,167
fields (2,468 contracts) in 38 non-OPEC countries in Europe,
Africa, Central Asia, and Far East Asia.4 It is essentially a
tax simulator for hydrocarbon projects.
Given an oil price projection, the simulator calculates cash
flows to companies and governments. In particular, it allows
us to calculate the present value of the projected total gov-
ernment revenue stream from a certain hydrocarbon project,
given a projection for future oil prices, output, production
costs, and the relevant fiscal terms. We use the tax simula-
tor to isolate one element of the many different aspects of
real-world contracts: we determine how host country pay-
offs (their marginal tax rates) vary with the oil price, keeping
other parameters such as output fixed. More details on the tax
simulator are provided in the online appendix.
Figure 1 shows example outputs from the tax simulator for
fields in Algeria (Adrar Project) and France (Cazaux Project).
The simulator takes account of the plethora of taxes and fees
described above to show how the tax revenue profile varies
with the oil price. Table C2 in the online appendix provides
an overview of the undiscounted present value of govern-
ment revenues (remaining government take) from all fields
by country at different oil prices.
B. The Shape of Real-World Contracts
We find the tax payments from the IOC to the host coun-
try to be nearly linear in the oil price. The reason is that for
the countries in our sample, most real-world contracts do not
4 This commercially available data set was built to guide business deci-
sions for hydrocarbon companies and has been widely used in industry and
government. We could obtain a subsample of 38 countries. Researchers have
previously used these data in other contexts; see Kretzschmar, Kirchner, and
Reusch (2008).
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Figure 1.—Hydrocarbon Contract Structure
This figure shows the development of remaining government take as the oil price varies for the Adrar field, Algeria (left), and the Cazaux field, France (right).
explicitly condition on the oil price. Instead, they comprise
taxes on other outcomes, which are either fixed or rise linearly
with the oil price. Prominent examples are taxes on produc-
tion, revenues, corporate income, or profits (with refunds on
losses).
The tax simulator neither ignores tax terms that are non-
linear in the oil price nor imposes linearity. A few countries
do apply taxes that explicitly condition on the oil price in
a non linear fashion (see the online appendix for details).
First, windfall profits taxes (for example, in Algeria and
China) introduce nonlinearities at low and medium oil prices,
although tax payments become linear again at higher prices.
Second, a few countries employ elements of rate-of-return
taxes. A different source of nonlinearities is imperfect loss
offsets at persistent low oil prices (Mackie-Mason, 1990). At
these prices, there may not be enough future profits to offset
any initial losses. By considering all (both linear and nonlin-
ear) taxes, the tax simulator generates payment profiles for all
fields and companies. This allows us to investigate the over-
all importance of any nonlinear elements in the tax code. In
table 1, we present two measures of the degree of linearity in
these payment profiles: differences in slopes and the standard
deviation of the slope.
Linearity measure 1: Comparing slopes. The first mea-
sure to assess linearity is a comparison of slopes. A perfectly
linear contract’s payment profile has a constant slope at dif-
ferent prices. To compute the contract slope γi( p) at oil price
p for country i, we define the incremental revenue related to
a permanent per barrel oil price increase of Δp as
γi( p) =
(
TGRi ( p + Δp) − TGRi( p)
Δp
)
/RRi, (1)
where TGR( p) is the total undiscounted government revenue
over the remaining lifetime of the project, assuming the oil
price is constant at p. Furthermore, RR represents remain-
ing reserves measured in barrels that will be produced. This
gives γ an easy interpretation: at a specific oil price p, γi( p)
indicates the additional revenue per barrel the government
gets for a permanent $1 increase in the oil price. For a linear
contract, γi( p) = γi for all p.
Linearity measure 2: Standard deviation of the slope.
The second measure computes the standard deviation of the
slope γi( p) using n equally spaced oil prices. A drawback
of this measure is that a relatively high value could indicate
a progressive tax scheme or just variance around a constant
slope:
σ (γi( p)) =
√√√√ n∑
j=1
(
γi( pj) − γi
)2
/(n − 1). (2)
Table 1 presents γi(60), γi(100), and the difference in slope
(measure 1). We chose these values since the average oil price
in 2009 was approximately $60 per barrel, and in 2008 it
was $100 per barrel. We also show the standard deviation
of the slope (measure 2) for all countries in our sample.5
The standard deviation is computed using values of γi( p)
computed at oil prices from $20 to $100, in $10 increments.
Despite the complicated tax codes, measure 1 (difference
in slope) presented in table 1 shows that tax revenues can be
closely approximated by a linear function for oil prices in
excess of $60. In fact, for most countries in our sample, this
linear relationship holds for much lower oil prices. The vast
majority of countries have a taxation structure that results in
a tax schedule that is almost linear in the oil price. Nonlinear
elements in the tax code may be present but play a minor
role. Angola is the only clear exception with progressive tax
rates at high oil prices. Besides a number of linear taxes,
5 As a third measure of linearity, one could calculate the R2 of the regres-
sion of government take per barrel on a constant φ1 and the oil price p for
each country i:
TGRi( p)
RRi
= φ1 + φ2p + ε.
In our sample, R2 varies between 0.95 and 1.
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Table 1.—Measures of Linearity of Contracts between Countries and IOCs
Country Slope at $60 Slope at $100 Difference in Slope SD of Slope
Algeria 0.553 0.566 0.013 0.033
Angola 0.648 0.760 0.112 0.116
Azerbaijan 0.675 0.668 −0.007 0.034
Brunei 0.521 0.521 0.000 0.000
Bulgaria 0.054 0.080 0.027 0.024
Cameroon 0.626 0.619 −0.006 0.086
Chad 0.555 0.550 −0.005 0.034
China 0.487 0.494 0.007 0.066
Croatia 0.056 0.056 0.000 0.008
Democratic Republic of Congo 0.629 0.630 0.000 0.023
Denmark 0.565 0.569 0.004 0.026
Egypt 0.389 0.390 0.001 0.026
Equatorial Guinea 0.522 0.523 0.001 0.031
France 0.345 0.349 0.003 0.128
Gabon 0.644 0.653 0.009 0.033
Georgia 0.270 0.270 0.000 0.000
Germany 0.388 0.388 0.000 0.013
Hungary 0.238 0.238 0.000 0.000
Indonesia 0.537 0.537 0.000 0.025
Ireland 0.143 0.146 0.003 0.061
Kazakhstan 0.509 0.538 0.029 0.110
Kyrgyzstan 0.502 0.502 0.000 0.000
Libya 0.693 0.709 0.016 0.028
Malaysia 0.471 0.488 0.017 0.028
Myanmar 0.420 0.416 −0.004 0.009
Netherlands 0.336 0.339 0.003 0.034
Norway 0.632 0.633 0.001 0.029
Philippines 0.376 0.376 0.000 0.003
Poland 0.099 0.099 0.000 0.003
Republic of Congo 0.496 0.497 0.001 0.014
Romania 0.253 0.253 0.000 0.002
Thailand 0.295 0.297 0.002 0.006
Tunisia 0.398 0.402 0.004 0.028
Turkmenistan 0.522 0.501 −0.021 0.044
Ukraine 0.204 0.204 0.000 0.018
United Kingdom 0.451 0.452 0.001 0.008
Uzbekistan 0.540 0.503 −0.036 0.062
Vietnam 0.538 0.544 0.005 0.040
Angola employs a rate-of-return tax.6 IOCs’ profit share typ-
ically decreases from 75% to 10% when the rate of return
increases from 0% to 40% (WoodMackenzie, 2009). Some
fields, like Adrar in figure 2, exhibit nonlinearities due to
imperfect loss offsets in the tax payments at low oil prices, as
well as the presence of windfall profit taxes, as described in
the online appendix.7 This explains why measure 2 (standard
deviation of the slope) is relatively high for France, Kaza-
khstan, Cameroon, China, and Uzbekistan. These countries
have progressive taxes for low prices only, or a noisy tax
system that does not exhibit progressivity at high oil prices.
6 Kazakhstan and Tunisia also have rate-of-return taxes in their tax codes,
but the tax simulator shows that the resulting profile still lacks progres-
sivity at high oil prices. Bulgaria and Kazakhstan have slightly increasing
slopes, while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have slightly decreasing slopes
between $60 and $100. However, these differences are small. Also, the slope
becomes constant at oil prices above $80.
7 Since we use undiscounted revenues and a constant oil price to facilitate
the interpretation of gamma, our calculations do not reflect any imperfect
loss offsets due to time discounting. We acknowledge this but emphasize that
this issue is less of a concern for low and high oil prices. At low prices, losses
are never recovered, independent of time discounting. At high oil prices,
the relevant range to study expropriations, losses are recovered quickly.
The observation of nearlinearity is as strong as it may be
surprising and is discussed section IV.E.8
IV. The Optimal Contract
In this section, we determine theoretical properties of the
optimal contract between an IOC and a host country. We show
that introducing incomplete information about a country’s
expropriation cost into models similar to those of Thomas and
Worrall (1994) leads to an optimal contract in which expro-
priations occur with positive probability. We then restrict
our attention to contracts that are linear in the oil price, as
observed in the data. We find that the near linearity of con-
tracts provides an additional explanation for expropriation
at high oil prices. We also find that insurance is increas-
ing in a country’s cost of expropriation and decreasing in
8 To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to empirically demon-
strate the linearity in hydrocarbon contracts for a wide geographical range
of contracts. However, others have commented on the lack of progressivity
for specific cases (Land, 2008; Lovas & Osmundsen, 2009).
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its relative production efficiency. In section VI, we test for
these predictions in the data and find them to hold for the
countries in our sample.
A. Model Setup
We consider a single risk-neutral IOC that is offered a
contract to extract oil in a risk-averse host country. Coun-
tries in which a significant part of the budget is financed by
oil exports suffer from large swings in oil-related revenues.
Problems associated with this justify the assumption of risk
aversion with respect to revenues, especially for low-income
countries (Daniel, 2001; Boadway & Keen, 2009). In our
model, we assume the IOC to be risk neutral for simplicity.
Even with two risk-averse agents, however, there are welfare
gains from risk sharing. Therefore our comparative statics are
unaffected by this assumption.
We assume that the host country extracts all the rents from
oil production (since there are n ≥ 2 IOCs bidding for the
contract). An IOC can credibly commit to any contract that
has at least a net present value of 0 since it could be sued in
its country of incorporation if it reneged on the contract. The
host country can expropriate the company at any time.
Consider in addition the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. The country’s one-period utility function
is given by u(g), where u is increasing, concave, and twice
differentiable and g represents the country’s GDP. The
GDP is the sum of the country’s nonoil GDP, g0, and its
oil-related GDP, goil, which equals the product of the coun-
try’s oil production q and the per barrel price received by
the country p:
g = g0 + goil = g0 + pq. (3)
For the remainder of the paper, we assume
u(g) = g
1−η
1 − η , (4)
with η ∈ [0, 1], which is the constant relative risk aversion
power utility function for moderate levels of risk aversion.
Assumption 2. The oil price p is identical and indepen-
dently distributed (i.i.d.) over time with mean
_
p and domain
[0, ∞). f (.) represents the probability density function of
the oil price.
We follow Guriev et al. (2011) and assume an i.i.d. price
process for tractability. This contrasts with the geometric
Brownian motion traditionally assumed in the finance litera-
ture (Pindyck, 1981; Gibson & Schwartz, 1990). Stochastic
processes with weaker or no mean reversion would compli-
cate the analysis but strengthen our results since oil price
persistence reinforces the incentives for expropriation at high
oil prices.
Assumption 3. Production q does not vary with the oil
price.
This assumption is a good approximation for the non-
OPEC countries that are the focus of this paper. Non-OPEC
countries generally produce and export as much oil as possi-
ble at any given price (International Energy Agency, 2009).
The geological properties of oil and gas fields are such that
the lifetime production profile can be adjusted only within
very small bounds. Too much pressure on the field can dam-
age the field and harm future production rates. Oil fields
thus typically produce flat out during their entire lifetime,
largely independent of the current oil price (Engel & Fischer,
2010). In other words, “geology sets maximum production
rates, not economics” (Leighty, 2008). The small short-term
global spare capacity largely stems from a few OPEC fields
with significant on-site storage or fields that can be shut
down temporarily. Hence, fixing production is a reasonable
assumption.9 Note that the fixed oil production assumption
is a convenient but not material simplification. If production
could be adjusted upward in response to a higher oil price, it
would make expropriation more attractive at high oil prices.
The comparative statics of the model would be unaffected.
Assumption 4. The country faces utility cost (or bene-
fit) μ > 0 on expropriation. In each period there are two
potential values, μL < μH , drawn from an i.i.d. Bernoulli
distribution with probabilities πμL and πμH known to both
parties. The realization of this parameter is unobservable
to the IOC, but known to the country after μ and p are
simultaneously determined.
In practice, a number of factors contribute to this cost.
First, μ reflects the cost of domestic legal challenges to
expropriation (Engel & Fischer, 2010). Second, the company
might recover some of its loss through international arbi-
tration, imposing costs on the expropriating country. Third,
μ includes the loss of a country’s international reputation
following an expropriation. This reputation loss has been
shown to depress foreign direct investment (Eaton & Gerso-
vitz, 1984; Bohn & Deacon, 2000; Azzimonti & Sarte, 2007;
Stroebel & van Benthem, 2013) and to lead to less favorable
terms in the international credit market (Cole, Dow, & Eng-
lish, 1995). Finally, μ also contains possible benefits or costs
of expropriation in light of domestic political motives. It is
especially this last component of μ that is primarily observ-
able to governments. The other components are (partially)
observable to both parties. For the remainder of this section,
the key assumption is that there is asymmetric information
about at least one of the components of μ.
Assumption 5. After expropriation, the host country will
revert to autarky: it will produce oil and sell at the world oil
9 As discussed in section II, we abstract from investment incentives as a
function of the oil price (and thus tax).
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price forever. Moreover, it will incur a relative efficiency
loss of δ.
This assumption is a stylized version of what happens in
practice. Often, after a number of years and potentially a
regime change, international investors may return to the coun-
try. This does not change the qualitative predictions of our
model. The efficiency loss δ reflects that IOCs possess spe-
cific operational or technical knowledge that allows them to
extract oil at a lower cost than the host country can (Opp,
2008; Wolf, 2009). The larger the efficiency advantage δ
of the IOC, the more costly it is for the host country to
expropriate.
Assumption 6. The contract can be conditioned only on
the observed oil price, p, not on the realization of the
unobserved value μ. The contract is fully described by the
function y( p), which captures the contractual government
revenues at each price.
Assumption 7. The IOC makes zero profits in expecta-
tion: Ep,μ[ p − y( p)] = 0.
Note that for notational simplicity, we normalize annual
production costs to 0. Introducing nonzero production costs
would be a straightforward extension that does not change
the model structure or implications. Similarly, we normal-
ize upfront investment cost to 0. A model extension could
involve an exploration phase before a production phase, and
both would be covered by the contract. The firm then needs to
recover its exploration investment I in expectation, which cor-
responds to Ep,μ[ p−y( p)] ≥ I > 0 instead of assumption 7.
This does not have a qualitative impact on the comparative
statics of contract structure.
The Country’s Expropriation Decision. At each point in
time, on realizing the current oil price p and its expropriation
cost μ, a country has two options. It can expropriate the IOC,
thereby receiving revenues pq while facing a utility cost μ.
After expropriation, the country will remain in autarky for-
ever. Given assumptions 4 and 5, the value function for the
country when expropriating is given by
Ve( p, μ) = u(g0 + pq) − μ + βVaut , (5)
where β is the time discount factor and the value of autarky,
Vaut , is defined as
Vaut = Ep
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(g0 + (1 − δ)pq)
]
(6)
= 1
1 − β
∫ ∞
0
u(g0 + (1 − δ)pq)f ( p)dp.
Note that since the oil price is i.i.d, Vaut is a constant. Alter-
natively, the country can choose to honor the terms of the
contract, earning contract payoff y( p) today, while facing
the same option to expropriate in the next period. The value
of honoring the contract is given by
Vh( p) = u(g0 + y( p)q) + βEp,μ[max(Ve( p, μ), Vh( p))]
= u(g0 + y( p)q) + βVc. (7)
The incentive compatibility constraint for the host country at
a certain oil price p and realization of μ, which we denote by
IC( p, μ), binds if Vh( p) = Ve( p, μ).
The IOC’s Participation Constraint. Since the problem is
stationary, the firm’s participation constraint has no dynamic
elements to it. In every period, the IOC must be at least ex ante
indifferent between accepting the contract or leaving. Π is the
set of ( p, μ) combinations for which the country chooses to
honor the contract, that is, for which Vh( p) ≥ Ve( p, μ). The
IOC’s participation constraint then becomes∫ ∫
( p,μ)∈Π
( p − y ( p)) f ( p)f (μ)dpdμ ≥ 0. (8)
B. Benchmark Model with No Asymmetric Information
Under the benchmark case with complete information
about the realization of μ, the optimal contract will involve
payments that are conditioned on both p and μ and avoid
all expropriations.10 To simplify the intuition, assume in this
section and the next that in each period, there are only two
possible oil prices, pL and pH , drawn from an i.i.d. Bernoulli
distribution with probabilities πpL and πpH . Any contract
that improves on autarky will reduce the revenue volatility
for the host country and require y( pL) > pL. For the IOC
to break even in expectation, it also requires y( pH) < pH .
This means that expropriations would occur only at pH ,
when per barrel contractual payments to the country are
less than the world market price. Now consider a contract
that did involve expropriations at (pH , μL), that is, where
Ve( pH , μL) > Vh( pH). This contract cannot be optimal: it
is possible to raise y( pH , μL) to a value below pH such that
the country is indifferent between expropriating and honor-
ing the contract. The IOC now receives a positive revenue
at ( pH , μL), which it can redistribute to the country in other
states of the world. By an analogous argument, a contract that
involves expropriation at (pH , μH) is also suboptimal. Con-
sequently, if contracts can be conditioned on the realization
of μ, the optimal contract’s payoff at pH is as low as pos-
sible without violating the country’s incentive compatibility
constraint. This generates the maximum possible insurance
at low oil prices.
10 See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) for a full exposition. This relaxes
assumption 6. Instead of assumption 4, we now assume that the realization
of μ is still stochastic but observable to both parties in every period. We
thank an anonymous referee for suggesting we include a discussion of this
benchmark case.
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C. Expropriation under the Optimal Contract
In this section, we show that in the presence of asymmet-
ric information about a country’s μ, expropriations cannot
always be avoided, even under the optimal contract. Follow-
ing assumption 6, the contract specifies tax payments y( pL)
and y( pH). The timing of the contracting game is as follows:
1. y( pL) and y( pH) are agreed on.
2. Each period, the oil price p and the cost of expropriation
μ are simultaneously realized.
3. The country has three choices: expropriate immediately
at cost μ, take the contractual payment y( p), or enter
into renegotiation at time cost η (Waelde, 2008, points
out that the time and litigation costs of renegotiations
are high).
4. If the country wants renegotiation, the company makes
a take-it-or-leave-it counteroffer x( p), which the coun-
try can accept or reject. A rejection leads to expropria-
tion at cost μ. Successful renegotiation incurs a cost of
φ(μ), where μ > φ(μ) > 0, since reputational costs
will still be incurred even if legal procedures can be
avoided.
Note that this multiperiod problem is stationary. Since p
and μ are i.i.d., the game repeats itself each period. Therefore,
in the discussion, we focus on the simple one-period problem.
We determine some of the key features of the optimal contract
under the assumptions specified above by looking for perfect
Bayesian equilibria. If the country’s actions do not reveal its
μ in equilibrium (by choosing the same action at μL and
μH), the company’s beliefs follow Bayes’ rule and are πμL
and πμH .
Proposition 1: There will never be renegotiation in equi-
librium.
Proof. See appendix B.
Proposition 1 argues that the optimal contract will never
lead to renegotiation.11 This means that we can focus on find-
ing the tax contract that optimizes the country’s utility under
11 This conclusion is robust to allowing multiple rounds of IOC counterof-
fers. Unraveling still occurs, since given the best counteroffer the company
will ever make, renegotiation is never optimal for the μL country. We also
consider an alternative renegotiation mechanism in which the country makes
an offer to the IOC in the renegotiation process: We assume that the coun-
try cannot commit to actual expropriation if its offer is rejected. In this
game, there may be renegotiations under some parameter combinations.
μH always imitates μL if μL successfully renegotiates. This rules out the
existence of a separating equilibrium. A pooling equilibrium with renego-
tiation in which the IOC accepts the country’s offer could exist. At an oil
price where neither μL nor μH wants to expropriate, no expropriation threat
can be credible, and there is no renegotiation. By proposition 2, the optimal
contract avoids situations where both μL and μH want to expropriate. It
remains to consider an oil price at which μL wants to expropriate but μH
does not. The minimum amount the IOC would accept, e, is the expected
value of the payment it would get if it rejected the offer. This is equal to
e = πL · 0+ πH ( p − y( p)). If it were offered less, it would be optimal
to reject and hope that the country turns out to be a μH country trying to
the allocation determined by the contract, not the allocation
that results from renegotiation.
Proposition 2: y( pL) > pL. There are two possible optimal
values for y( pH), defined by binding incentive compatibility
constraints IC( pH , μL) and IC ( pH , μH):
1. y( pH) is such that expropriation never happens.
2. y( pH) is such that expropriations will happen only
at μL.
Proof. See appendix B.
Proposition 2 states that the optimal contract may
involve expropriation at μL. Note that there are two pos-
sible equilibria at pH : a no-expropriation contract and a
contract with expropriation at μL only, both subject to
the company’s participation constraint πpL ( pL − y( pL)) +
πpH ( pH − y( pH))
(
1 − πexp
)
, where the probability of
expropriation πexp = 0 for the no-expropriation contract and
πexp = πμL for the expropriation contract. The optimal con-
tract is the one that maximizes the country’s utility. Whether
this optimal contract will involve expropriations in equilib-
rium depends on the distribution of μ.12 In appendix B, we
relax the assumption of only two values for μ.
This result has an important implication. With incomplete
information about a country’s cost (or willingness) to expro-
priate, it is possible that expropriations are part of an optimal
contract. In such a situation, no a priori efficiency gain is pos-
sible by always avoiding them. A partial answer to our first
main question is therefore that expropriations may happen
because they can be part of the equilibrium behavior under
an optimal contract.
The intuition for why expropriations could occur in the
optimal contract is as follows. Given the country’s risk aver-
sion, the contract ideally redistributes government revenues
from high-price to low-price states by reducing y( pH) and
imitate a μL country. Whether it is optimal for μL to offer e rather than to
expropriate directly depends on the relative size of μL , δ, η, φ(μ), and πH .
12 Under the strong assumption of risk neutrality of the IOC, we can say
more about the shape of the optimal contract for a continuous price dis-
tribution f ( p). In that case, there exists a p′ such that the optimal contract
involves constant tax payments at prices p ≤ p′. There may also exist a
lowest p′′ such that IC(μH) binds. For p′ ≤ p < p′′, IC(μL) binds, the
optimal contract is increasing in p, and no expropriations occur. For some
p ≥ p′′, expropriations occur when μ = μL . A proof is available from the
authors.
We also considered whether there exists a set of contracts with payments
conditional on both the oil price and an announced cost of expropriation
by the government, μ̂ ∈ {μ̂L , μ̂H}, that would induce governments to truth-
fully announce their realization of μ. If announcing μ̂L was costly and was
sufficiently more costly for a μH country than for a μL country, then there
exists a set of incentive-compatible contracts contingent on ( p, μ̂) that do
not feature expropriations on the equilibrium path (the contractual pay-
ments would mirror those described in section IVB, which assumed perfect
information about μ). This might be the case, for example, if the IOC could
enforce a punishment for announcing μ̂L that would impose larger costs on
a μH country than on a μL country. We thank a referee for bringing this set
of contracts to our attention.
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increasing y( pL). However, this redistribution from high-
price states increases the incentives to expropriate. At the
same time, the decrease in y( pH) increases the IOC’s profit if
μH occurs. Hence, the contract accepts expropriations at μL
in exchange for higher profits at μH , which allows for more
insurance.
To formalize this intuition, we derive a condition under
which expropriations occur in the optimal contract with a
continuous oil price distribution as in assumption 2. First,
consider the contract in which IC( p, μL) binds ∀p ∈ P,
where P is some compact set of oil prices: expropriations
are avoided ∀p ∈ P. Now consider the following change to
the contract: for a price region [̂p, p̂+ε] ⊂ P, reduce contract
payments such that IC( p, μH) binds. This will increase the
IOC’s revenue when μH is realized, but in the case of μL, the
IOC will be expropriated and receive nothing. Formally, the
change Δ in the IOC’s expected revenue is
Δ = πμH
×
∫ p̂+ε
p̂
(u−1(u( p) − μL) − u−1(u( p) − μH)))︸ ︷︷ ︸ f
Increased IOC revenues at μH
( p)dp
− πμL
∫ p̂+ε
p̂
( p − u−1(u( p) − μL))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lost IOC revenues at μL
f ( p)dp. (9)
If the IOC’s expected revenues increase (Δ > 0), this allows
an increase in the contractual payments from y( p) to y′( p),
for p ∈ P′, where P′ is a region such that y( p|p ∈ P′) ≤
y( p|p /∈ P′). The new contractual payments ∀p ∈ P′ are
y′( p) = y( p) + Δ∫̃
p∈P′ f (̃p)dp̃
. (10)
The redistribution will generate a welfare increase for the
country if∫
p∈P′
[u(y′( p)) − u(y( p))] f ( p)dp
>
∫ p̂+ε
p̂
[ u( p) − μL︸ ︷︷ ︸
Utility from pre-change payment
− (πμH (u( p) − μH) + πμL (u( p) − μL))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected utility from post-change payment
] f ( p)dp
(11)
=
∫ p̂+ε
p̂
πμH (μH − μL)f ( p)dp.
Whether condition (11) holds depends on the specific param-
eterization. It is more likely to hold for smaller values of πμL .
In that case, the shift to IC( p, μH) causes few expropriations
and thus allows for a larger reduction in revenue volatility.
D. The Linear Contract
Since real-world tax contracts exhibit a high degree of lin-
earity, in this section we restrict ourselves to linear contracts.
This parametric restriction allows us to obtain a number
of additional predictions about the determinants of contract
structure. We analyze (a) the solution of the optimal linear
hydrocarbon contract, (b) what determines the probability
of expropriation, and (c) how the optimal linear contract
structure varies with the cost of expropriation, the IOC’s effi-
ciency advantage, hydrocarbon production, and GDP. The
country’s expropriation choice as well as the IOC’s partic-
ipation constraint remain unaffected by the focus on linear
contracts. The optimal linear contract remains renegotiation
proof. Assumption 6 is changed to:
Assumption 8. The only allowable per barrel contracts
between the host country and IOC are linear in the
following way:
y( p) = α + γ( p − _p) γ ∈ [0, 1], α > 0, (12)
α + γ( p − p) ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ [0, ∞). (13)
y( p) consists of a fixed positive payment α and a variable part
that is linear in the oil price. Note that autarky corresponds
to α = _p and γ = 1, while a contract that eliminates all risk
for the country has γ = 0. The second condition ensures
that the government’s receipts are never negative. Under
these assumptions, the optimal contract can be described as
follows.
Proposition 3: If there exists a p in the domain for which
Ve( p, μH) > Vh( p), the domain of p can be divided into
three regions. ∃p∗, p∗∗ such that (i) for p ≤ p∗, expropri-
ation will never take place, independent of the realization
of μ : ∀p ≤ p∗, ∀μ : Vh( p) ≥ Ve( p, μ); (ii) for p∗ <
p ≤ p∗∗, we only see expropriation when μL is realized:
∀p ∈ [p∗, p∗∗], Vh( p) ≥ Ve( p, μH) and Vh( p) < Ve( p, μL);
and (iii) for p > p∗∗, we will see expropriation occuring inde-
pendently of the realization of μ : ∀p > p∗∗, ∀μ : Vh( p) <
Ve( p, μ).
Proof. See appendix B.
In words, there exists an oil price p∗ below which expro-
priation is never optimal. There may also exist an oil price
p∗∗ above which expropriation is always optimal. In between
p∗ and p∗∗, expropriation occurs only if the country’s cost of
expropriation is low. Since we assume i.i.d. oil prices, each
period expropriation will take place with the same ex ante
probability πμL (F( p
∗∗) − F( p∗)) + (1 − F( p∗∗)).
The cut-off prices p∗ and p∗∗ are functions of μH , μL, g0,
and q, as well as the contract parameters α and γ, and can be
obtained by solving the following two equations:
Vh( p
∗) = Ve( p∗, μL), (14)
Vh( p
∗∗) = Ve( p∗∗, μH). (15)
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Figure 2.—Comparative Statics, Varying μH and δ, and Low Nonoil GDP
This figure shows the comparative statics of contract slope γ (top row) and the probability of expropriation (bottom row) with respect to the cost of expropriation μH (left column) and the efficiency advantage of the
IOC δ (right column). Other parameters are η = 12 , q = 1, g0 = 50, and πμH = 0.9. When varying μH , δ = 0.05. When varying δ, μH = 6.
By restricting ourselves to linear contracts, we can solve for
the optimal contract parameters (α, γ) that solve the host
country’s optimization problem:
U∗ = max
α,γ
∫ p∗(α,γ)
0
[u(g0 + (α + γ( p − _p))q) + βVc]
× f ( p)dp (16)
+
∫ p∗∗(α,γ)
p∗(α,γ)
(
πμL
[
u(g0 + pq) − μL + βVaut
]
+πμH [u(g0 + (α + γ( p − _p))q) + βVc]
)
f ( p) dp
+
∫ ∞
p∗∗(α,γ)
(u(g0 + pq) + βVaut − μHπμH − μLπμL )
× f ( p)dp,
subject to the company’s participation constraint, equation
(8), and with Vc defined in equation (7). The country’s incen-
tive compatibility constraints are implicit, since p∗ (α, γ) and
p∗∗ (α, γ) are defined in equations (14) and (15) such that the
country always makes an optimal choice.
We are now ready to provide a full answer to the first
main question: Why do expropriations occur? There are two
reasons. First, as shown in section IVB, expropriations may
occur as part of an optimal contract if there is incomplete
information about the country’s willingness to expropriate.
Proposition 3 shows that incomplete information remains a
reason for expropriation under the commonly used linear tax
contracts. The proposition also shows that there may exist
an oil price range for which expropriation is always pre-
ferred. Hence, linear contracts constitute a second reason for
expropriations at high oil prices.
E. Comparative Statics of the Linear Contract
This section presents (numerical) comparative statics of
the optimal linear contract. The key comparative statics of
interest are how the contract insurance parameter γ varies
with the cost of expropriation, μ, and the efficiency advantage
of the IOC, δ. We also discuss comparative statics for GDP g
and oil production q. All comparative statics are qualitatively
similar to those from the unconstrained contract. The results
in this section, and therefore the answer to our second main
question, do not rely on contract linearity.
To conduct simulations, we follow Gibson and Schwartz
(1990) and specify an instantaneous log-normal oil price dis-
tribution, parameterized to the period 1999 to 2009, with a
mean oil price of approximately $46. As discussed in assump-
tion 2, we assume an i.i.d. oil price process. We set nonoil
GDP g0 equal to 50. We keep oil production q at a value
of 1. At the mean oil price, this parameterization implies
that about 50% of the country’s GDP is hydrocarbon related.
As discussed in note 3, this fraction reflects the high hydro-
carbon intensity of the economies of many countries in our
sample. We assume that the country’s one-period utility is
u(g) = √g. We choose a discount factor of β = 0.9. Further-
more, we assume that μL = 0.5μH and that πμH = 0.9
and πμL = 0.1. The predictions regarding the determi-
nants of contract structure obtained in this section are tested
empirically in section VI.
Vary expropriation costs and production efficiency loss
(μH and δ). Figure 2 (left column) shows the comparative
statics of the contract parameters with respect to the cost of
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Figure 3.—Comparative Statics, Varying μH and δ, and High Nonoil GDP
This figure shows the comparative statics of contract slope γ (top row) and the probability of expropriation (bottom row) with respect to the cost of expropriation μH (left column) and the efficiency advantage of the
IOC δ (right column). Other parameters are η = 12 , q = 1, g0 = 500, πμH = 0.9. When varying μH , δ = 0.05. When varying δ, μH = 6.
expropriation, μH , while keeping δ, g0, and q fixed (at 0.05,
50, and 1, respectively). Varying the expropriation cost has
two main consequences. First, the slope of the linear con-
tract γ (inversely related to insurance) is decreasing in μH .
A higher μH increases a country’s ability to commit, which
allows contracts with more insurance. Second, the probabil-
ity of expropriation is decreasing in μH despite the fact that
the contract adjusts to provide the host country with more
insurance.
The comparative statics of increasing μH are similar to the
comparative statics of increasing the production efficiency
loss δ. Both make reneging on the contract more costly to
the host country. A higher efficiency loss δ increases the
cost of autarky. Hence, figure 2 (right column) shows that
contract insurance is increasing in δ, and the probability of
expropriation is decreasing in δ.13
Figure 3 shows the comparative statics for a richer country
in which oil production contributes only approximately 10%
13 We choose 0 ≤ δ ≤ 0.1 as the relevant range, based on the (sparse)
literature on relative production efficiency of NOCs and estimates of pro-
duction costs. Eller, Hartley, and Medlock (2007) and Wolf (2009) estimate
that NOC production efficiency is 21% to 48% lower than IOC efficiency.
There is little public information on the production cost of oil, but even
unconventional oil can be produced at costs as low as $5 to $10 (Interna-
tional Energy Authority, 2010). Using the upper ends of both ranges, the
NOC’s additional production cost would be about $5. Using our average oil
price, this implies an upper estimate of δ of about 0.1. For μH , we consider
values between 0 and 10. At the mean oil price, total GDP is about 100, and
period utility is about 10. This means that the upper limit of the range for
μH corresponds to a loss of a full period’s GDP.
to GDP. To do this, we set g0 = 500 while keeping all other
parameter values the same. The comparative statics do not
change qualitatively: insurance is still increasing in μ and δ,
and the probability of expropriation is decreasing. The prob-
ability of expropriation is lower, since for richer countries,
the same utility cost of expropriation translates into a higher
dollar cost.14
Vary oil production and total GDP. While the compar-
ative statics with respect to μH and δ give unambiguous
predictions on the contract slope γ, the effects of changing
hydrocarbon production and GDP are more subtle because
of two countervailing forces. Increasing a country’s hydro-
carbon production (keeping total GDP fixed) has the effect
that at any given oil price, the financial gain from expro-
priation is larger. This makes expropriation more attractive
and reduces the insurance provided by the optimal contract.
A countervailing effect is that a country with more hydro-
carbon production suffers more from losing insurance and
operational expertise in autarky, which makes expropriation
less attractive and increases contract insurance. The effect of
increasing GDP is similarly ambiguous.
Which effect dominates depends on the current level of
production, GDP, risk aversion, and, most notably, the gov-
ernment’s time discount factor. The former effect dominates
for low discount factors, while the latter effect dominates
14 The comparative statics are robust to a wide range of parameter values.
Results available from the authors on request.
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for high discount factors. We empirically test which effect
dominates in our data set in section VI.
F. Possible Reasons for the Linearity of Real-World Contracts
We observed in section III that real-world hydrocarbon
extraction contracts are overwhelmingly linear. Section IV
uses this empirical observation to motivate our focus on
analyzing the optimal linear contract, since this paper con-
centrates on explaining why the contracts that we observe in
practice give rise to expropriations and different degrees of
oil price insurance for host countries.
The observed linearity of real-world contracts could be due
to at least two reasons. First, it is possible that the optimal
contract can be closely approximated by a linear contract. In
other words, welfare gains from explicitly conditioning the
contract on the oil price may be small. Second, there may
be complementary explanations for the linear taxation struc-
tures, which could help to explain the observed contracts. We
discuss three of these explanations.
One potential reason for linear contracting falls under the
broad heading of cognitive costs. Countries have a habit of
using an existing menu of taxes, almost all of which rise lin-
early with the oil price. Given the preexisting framework of
fixed fees, production, revenue, and profit taxes, the design of
a completely different tax system that explicitly conditions on
the oil price may be deemed too cumbersome. Thinking about
different contract designs and seeing through their implica-
tions is costly (Tirole, 2009). This argument is especially
strong for inexperienced governments (Amadi, Germiso, &
Henriksen, 2006).
Another possible explanation for linear contracts relates to
incentives in the negotiation process. It may be uncomfortable
and risky for an IOC to directly discuss the issue of potential
future expropriation with a foreign government. This may
signal a lack of trust: “The government … will send out only
positive signals so that excessive attention to the political risk
at the tail-end of the investment cycle may appear inappro-
priate and likely to poison the relationship” (Waelde, 2008).
Similarly, under asymmetric information, a government may
not want to address the risk of future unfavorable regime
changes. Such a dynamic is captured in Spier’s (1992) expla-
nation of contractual incompleteness, in which an agent may
refrain from including a particular clause in a contract in
order not to signal his type. Here, a country that suggests the
need for a progressive taxation scheme might be signaling a
higher willingness to expropriate. Therefore negotiators may
shy away from suggesting a move toward nonlinear taxation.
In addition, the IOC negotiators are likely to have a strong
personal interest in closing a deal quickly, which may dis-
courage them from deviating significantly from preexisting
tax frameworks.
A further possible explanation is that high marginal tax
rates in a progressive taxation system distort investment
incentives (Blake & Roberts, 2006) or encourage the abuse of
transfer pricing (Engel & Fischer, 2010). When marginal tax
rates differ across countries, transfer pricing allows a com-
pany to shift profits between tax jurisdictions to minimize
the overall tax burden. A typical method for a company is to
overstate its costs, claim excessive management fees, or pro-
vide capital equipment at above market leasing costs (Lund,
2009). Therefore, it may be difficult to design a unilateral
welfare-improving deviation from linear taxes toward high
marginal tax rates.
In summary, we suggest two possible explanations for the
linearity of observed hydrocarbon tax contracts. First, linear
contracts may not deviate strongly from the optimal contract.
Second, cognitive costs, incentives in the negotiation process,
and transfer pricing make it difficult for a country to move to
alternative taxation structures.15
V. Data
The unit of observation in our empirical analysis is a set of
tax terms agreed between a company and a country, pertain-
ing to an individual field. Table C3 in the online appendix
provides summary statistics for the year 2007. We match
these fiscal terms with country characteristics at the time of
signing the contract. For each contract, we take the year in
which the company’s stake in the field is first recorded by
WoodMackenzie.
Government tax revenue: This is obtained from Wood-
Mackenzie as described in section III. γ is directly calculated
from these data using equation (1).
Total remaining reserves and current production: Total
remaining reserves are defined as the sum of all oil and gas,
both expressed in millions of barrels of oil equivalent, that
is expected to be produced from the start of 2010 until the
field shuts down. Annual production is available for each
year since production started. These numbers are taken from
WoodMackenzie.
Company classification: We classified companies into
four categories: IOC, likely IOC, national oil company
(NOC), and partial NOC. To do this, we analyzed the share-
holder structure of each of the 445 companies in our sample
in Bloomberg (extended with Internet search). Whenever we
could confirm that the government had no shares in the com-
pany, it was classified as an IOC. If we could not confirm this
but found no evidence of a government share, the company
was classified as likely IOC. NOCs are defined as companies
in which the combined local and federal government share
exceeds 50%, while this share is below 50% for the “partial
NOC” category.
15 Communication with academic energy economists and industry experts
from BP and WoodMackenzie supports this conclusion. Simple fixed rev-
enue sharing dominates “because it minimizes the potential for accounting
manipulation.” For inexperienced governments, “it takes time … to change
an existing system, which is why … most systems do not include these
more progressive elements.” The heuristic linear contracts approach did
not fully consider “implications for division of rents in such unprecedented
circumstances [the 2008 oil price spike].”
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GDP and population: Gross domestic product is taken
from the United Nations UNdata database. This covers the
period from 1970 onward. Population numbers are from the
United Nations Population Program.
Expropriations: This is a binary variable equal to 1 if an
expropriation occurred in a country-year observation. Cod-
ing expropriations requires a certain element of judgment.
To be consistent with past literature, we use the publicly
available expropriations data set compiled by Guriev et al.
(2011), complemented with recent expropriations from the
World Investment Report (2007).
Section IV discussed factors that contribute to a govern-
ment’s cost of expropriation and production efficiency loss.
We measure a country’s expropriation costs by its domes-
tic institutional quality and the amount of foreign direct
investment (FDI). In addition, we measure its hydrocar-
bon production efficiency by its cumulative hydrocarbon
extraction.
Institutional quality: We use an index that reflects the
quality of a country’s domestic legal institutions as one mea-
sure of the cost of expropriation to the government. Since
institutional quality varies over time as governments change,
it is critical to use a time series with a long history. The
only available comprehensive database that goes back to at
least 1965 is the Constraint on the Executive (CoE) Index
from the Polity IV database, which has been commonly used
by economists to measure institutional quality (Acemoglu,
Johnson, & Robinson, 2001). This index captures the extent
of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making pow-
ers of the executive branch of government. A seven-category
scale is used, with 1 signaling that there are no regular limi-
tations on the executive’s actions and formal restrictions on
the authority are regularly ignored. A 7 represents a regime
where accountability groups have effective authority equal to
or greater than the executive in most areas of activity. A low
CoE means little opportunity for legal action against the gov-
ernment’s decision and hence a lower cost of expropriation.
In addition, we tested the robustness of our empirical results
using an alternative proxy for expropriation costs: the Invest-
ment Profile Score provided by the PRS Group. This score is
“an assessment of factors affecting the risk to investment that
are not covered by other political, economic and financial risk
components” and includes contract viability/expropriation as
one of its subcomponents. It is scored between 1 and 12, with
a higher score representing a lower investment risk. Unfor-
tunately the coverage is somewhat more limited than that of
the Constraint on the Executive measure (it excludes Turk-
menistan, Uzbekistan, Chad, and Kyrgyzstan and starts only
in 1984).
FDI: We take inward FDI data from the United Nation’s
World Investment Report 2008.
Hydrocarbon production expertise: Production effi-
ciency and technological expertise are not easily measured.
Education indices such as school enrollment are too broad.
An effective way of capturing reliance on foreign exper-
tise is to measure the country’s own expertise in conducting
hydrocarbon projects. More previous engagement in hydro-
carbon extraction enhances both local technical knowl-
edge and operational experience and increases exposure
to international best practice. Hence, countries that have
developed more hydrocarbon projects will have acquired
more technical expertise (Bain, 2009). In addition, learning
by doing suggests that operational experience reduces the
NOC’s production cost, independent of technology spillovers
from IOCs. The learning-by-doing literature models produc-
tion costs as a function of cumulative output (Arrow, 1962;
Clark & Weyant, 2002). We thus employ the cumulative
hydrocarbon extraction of the country up to the point of
contract negotiation as a proxy for a country’s efficiency in
producing hydrocarbons.
VI. Empirical Analysis
This section empirically tests the main model implications:
(a) insurance in hydrocarbon contracts is increasing in direct
expropriation costs (in particular, those generated by domes-
tic institutions and dependence on FDI) and (b) increasing
in the dependence on foreign expertise. In addition, we test
how GDP and oil production affect contract insurance.16 We
also test the model’s predictions on the factors affecting the
probability of expropriation.
A. Regression Analysis: Explaining Contract Structure
We conduct a regression analysis to test the main model
predictions listed above. The unit of observation is a
company-field contract within a country, signed in a specific
year. There are 2,468 such combinations in our data set. The
dependent variable in all regressions is the slope parameter γ
at an oil price of $60 (γi(60)).17 The main explanatory vari-
ables correspond to the comparative statics from the model. In
columns 1 to 4 of Table 2, we use the Constraint on Executive
Index as our proxy for μ. In columns 5 and 6, we show that our
results are robust to using the Investment Profile Score. We
also include reliance on FDI to capture expropriation cost μ
and cumulative hydrocarbon production, which is a measure
of reliance on foreign production expertise δ.
In this section, we present OLS and WLS results and con-
clude that these are consistent with our model. A causal
interpretation would require stronger assumptions (or exoge-
nous variation in the regressors). While it is not obvious
that γ and the regressors are driven by the same unobserved
variables, endogeneity is a potential problem for a causal
interpretation. For instance, it is possible that variation in
unobservable or omitted institutional quality is correlated
with both γ and FDI. We acknowledge this possibility but
16 We measure insurance using γ, the marginal tax rate with respect to the
oil price. The model in section III assumes that α in equation (12) adjusts to
satisfy equation (8). If this were not the case, γ could still be interpreted as
measuring insurance, although it would not necessarily be actuarially fair.
17 Due to the near linearity of contracts illustrated in section III, results
remain robust when analyzing the slope parameter at different oil prices.
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Table 2.—Contract Structure Regressions
Dependent Variable: γ(60)
Constraint on Executive Investment Profile Score
OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Institutional quality −0.0170∗∗∗ −0.0173∗∗∗ −0.0204∗∗∗ −0.0209∗∗∗ −0.0188∗∗∗ −0.0188∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0024) (0.0024)
[0.0058] [0.0055] [0.0068]
Per capita FDI inflow −0.0341∗∗∗ −0.0341∗∗∗ −0.0300∗∗∗ −0.0301∗∗∗ −0.0230∗∗ −0.0232∗∗∗
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0051) (0.0051)
[0.0084] [0.0083] [0.0097]
Cumulative hydrocarbon 2.399∗∗ 2.417∗∗∗ 2.149∗∗ 2.165∗∗∗ 1.661∗ 1.634∗∗∗
production (0.465) (0.465) (0.488) (0.486) (0.480) (0.480)
[1.158] [1.030] [0.849]
R2 0.051 0.052 0.061 0.063 0.071 0.072
N 2,468 2,468 2,035 2,035 1,881 1,881
Columns 1–4 use the Constraint on the Executive as the proxy for μ; columns 5 and 6 use the Investment Profile Score. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the country-year level (used for asterisks) in
brackets. WLS weighting by remaining barrels of oil equivalent. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. Columns 1 and 2 include the full sample; columns 3 to 6 include IOCs only.
note that using and identifying (enough) instrumental vari-
ables is likely to be challenging and subject to a range of other
criticisms. Therefore, we choose to present OLS regressions
and interpret the results in table 2 as suggestive evidence
consistent with our model.
Column 1 of table 2 estimates the relationship suggested
by our comparative statics. Higher institutional stability is
associated with a smaller γ, and hence with better insurance.
In addition, higher reliance on FDI increases the insurance
obtained. Furthermore, a country with more experience in
hydrocarbon production obtains less insurance. Column 2
shows the same regression using weighted least squares. We
weight each observation by the size of the remaining reserves
of the relevant field. This is to rule out that the results in col-
umn 1 are primarily driven by a large number of contracts
that represent only a small fraction of overall production.
Columns 3 and 4 report similar results for IOCs only. This
specification is preferred because NOCs are (at least to a
large degree) owned by the government. Thus, the govern-
ment is the claimant to all NOC profits. Consequently, our
model has less clear predictions for tax contracts between
host governments and NOCs.
All results are highly statistically significant with standard
errors clustered at the country-year level, the highest level at
which the explanatory variables vary. The coefficients on the
regressors are also economically significant. For IOCs only,
a 1 standard deviation increase in the CoE index is associated
with a decline in γ of 0.05.18 Similarly, a 1 standard deviation
increase in the FDI per capita leads to a fall in γ of 0.03. A 1
standard deviation increase in cumulative production leads to
an increase in γ of 0.02. We hence conclude that the structure
of hydrocarbon contracts varies with our model parameters
in a consistent way.
18 There is a literature discussing the effects of endogenous matching on
estimates of contract determinants (Ackerberg & Botticini, 2002). In our
case, if companies were not perfectly risk-neutral, we would expect the
least risk averse companies to operate in the riskiesf (low μ) countries.
This would lead to a smaller coefficient on μ than when allocating IOCs
randomly to countries.
In columns 5 and 6, we repeat the regressions from columns
3 and 4 using the Investment Profile Score as the proxy for μ.
A 1 standard deviation increase in this measure is associated
with a decline in γ of about 0.05. The effect of changes in per
capita FDI and cumulative production is of similar magnitude
as before.
Table 3 includes per capita hydrocarbon production and
per capita real GDP as additional regressors. This is both to
ensure that our expropriation cost variables (especially cumu-
lative production) do not just pick up the effect of higher
current production and GDP and because the coefficients on
these variables are of intrinsic interest. Section IV argues that
the theoretical effects of GDP and oil production on contract
insurance are ambiguous. For instance, if countries heavily
discount the future, the relative importance of direct costs
and benefits from expropriations implies that countries with
higher GDP and lower oil production should obtain more
insurance. Since the future costs of autarky also decrease, this
conclusion may reverse when countries discount the future
less.
The results in table 3 show that the inclusion of the
additional regressors leaves the magnitude and statistical
significance of the expropriation cost variables unaffected.
Using column 3, we find that a 1 standard deviation increase
in real per capita GDP is associated with a decline in γ of
0.02. Likewise, a 1 standard deviation increase in per capita
hydrocarbon production is associated with an increase in γ
of 0.07. These results are consistent with the view that (for
the countries in our sample) as oil production becomes more
important, the immediate gains from expropriation outweigh
the losses these countries suffer in autarky. A possible expla-
nation is that these countries face a relatively high discount
rate.
In columns 5 and 6, we again present a robustness check
of the key empirical results with respect to the proxy for μ.
While the variable capturing reliance on FDI is no longer sta-
tistically significant, the coefficient on the Investment Profile
Score suggests that a 1 standard deviation increase in value
is associated with a decline in γ of 0.04. In summary, the
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Table 3.—Contract Structure Regressions
Dependent Variable: γ(60)
Constraint on Executive Investment Profile Score
OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Institutional quality −0.0243∗∗∗ −0.0247∗∗∗ −0.0236∗∗∗ −0.0240∗∗∗ −0.0162∗∗∗ −0.0161∗∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0025) (0.0025)
[0.0050] [0.0052] [0.0060]
Per capita FDI inflow −0.0242∗∗∗ −0.0240∗∗∗ −0.0221∗∗∗ −0.0220∗∗∗ −0.0054 −0.0054
(0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0051) (0.0051)
[0.0076] [0.0078] [0.0073]
Cumulative hydrocarbon 2.738∗∗∗ 2.779∗∗∗ 2.406∗∗∗ 2.441∗∗∗ 1.982∗∗ 1.983∗∗∗
production (0.437) (0.436) (0.463) (0.461) (0.467) (0.466)
[0.849] [0.843] [0.783]
Real per capita GDP −1.195 −1.232∗∗ −1.156 −1.204∗∗ −2.684∗∗∗ −2.758∗∗∗
(0.504) (0.502) (0.545) (0.543) (0.502) (0.501)
[0.893] [0.899] [0.750]
Per capita hydrocarbon 1.079∗∗∗ 1.085∗∗∗ 1.005∗∗∗ 1.012∗∗∗ 1.168∗∗∗ 1.175∗∗∗
production (0.061) (0.060) (0.067) (0.067) (0.0693) (0.0691)
[0.119] [0.113] [0.102]
R2 0.211 0.215 0.191 0.195 0.218 0.221
N 2,468 2,468 2,035 2,035 1,881 1,881
Columns 1–4 use the Constraint on the Executive as the proxy for μ; columns 5 and 6 use the Investment Profile Score. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the country-year level (used for asterisks) in
brackets. WLS weighting by remaining barrels of oil equivalent. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. Columns 1 and 2 include the full sample; columns 3 to 6 include IOCs only.
empirical results show that the observed structure of hydro-
carbon contracts is strikingly consistent with our main model
predictions. The results are robust to various econometric
specifications. While there will be other factors that influ-
ence contract structure, the regressions provide suggestive
evidence that a country’s quality of legal institutions, its
local technical expertise and FDI, as well as its GDP and
dependence on hydrocarbons are important drivers of the
structure of hydrocarbon contracts.
B. Regression Analysis: Explaining Expropriation Probability
As a robustness check for our linear contract model, we
also test a number of its predictions for the probability of
expropriation. The most direct implication is that expro-
priations are more likely when oil prices are high. The
second implication is that the probability of expropriation
is declining in the efficiency loss in autarky and the cost
of expropriation (figure 2). Finally, the signs on GDP and
hydrocarbon production in table 3 suggest that the relevant
parameter region of the model is the one where the expro-
priation probability increases with current oil production and
decreases with per capita GDP.
The expected magnitude of these effects is not obvious.
This is because (as shown in section VIA) contract structure
responds to expropriation incentives. Keeping contract struc-
ture fixed, the probability of expropriation increases as μ and
δ decrease. However, the new optimal contract will offer less
insurance, which provides a countervailing force. Therefore,
the resulting increase in the probability of expropriation may
be quantitatively small.
Guriev et al. (2011) analyzed the effect of a number of
these factors. However, in their analysis of expropriations
in the oil and gas sector, they included a large number
of countries without hydrocarbon production, and thus no
scope for expropriation by definition. In fact, the expropri-
ations data set that Guriev et al. (2011) used includes some
expropriations in the oil sector in country-years with zero
hydrocarbon production, possibly in the downstream sector.
We expand on their work by analyzing observations with
positive hydrocarbon production only and by adding hydro-
carbon production and cumulative production as additional
regressors (as suggested by our model).19 Table 4 shows
the results of a probit regression using both the full sample
with all countries and the subsample with positive production
observations only.
Table 4 shows that the model predictions generally hold in
the data. A higher oil price is associated with an increased
probability of expropriation. Using the results from column
4, a 1 standard deviation increase in the real oil price is
associated with an increase in the annual probability of expro-
priation of 0.84 percentage points. A 1 standard deviation
increase in cumulative hydrocarbon production is associated
with a 0.79 percentage point increase in the annual expropria-
tion probability. The statistical significance of the CoE index
depends on the specification, with the (statistically insignif-
icant) effect in column 4 being −0.45 percentage points for
a 1 standard deviation increase in the CoE index. Per capita
FDI is not significant in either sample. Per capita GDP and
hydrocarbon production are both significant and have the sign
expected given our results in the previous section. In Columns
5 and 6, we use the Investment Profile Score as our proxy
for μ. This proxy is statistically significant: a 1 standard
deviation increase in μ is associated with a 0.7 percentage
point fall in the annual probability of expropriation. Despite
the difficulties with precisely defining expropriations, it is
19 To use only publicly available data for this part of the analysis, we
took production figures from the International Energy Agency’s Extended
Energy Balances.
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Table 4.—Probit Regressions
Dependent Variable: Probability of Expropriation
Constraint on Executive Investment Profile Score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Real oil price 0.0001 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0006∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Institutional quality −0.0062∗∗∗ −0.0023∗∗ −0.0076∗∗∗ −0.0019 −0.0027∗∗ −0.0023∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Per capita FDI inflow −0.0049 0.0025 −0.0061 0.0034 −0.0040 −0.0108
(0.0059) (0.0072) (0.0079) (0.0093) (0.0034) (0.0171)
Cumulative hydrocarbon 0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗
production (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0008)
Real per capita GDP −0.0018∗∗∗ −0.0024∗∗∗ −0.0022∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007)
Per capita hydrocarbon 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0005
production (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004)
N 3,836 3,769 2,641 2,641 1,709 1,709
Table reports average probit marginal effects. Columns 1–4 use the Constraint on the Executive as the proxy for μ; columns 5 and 6 use the Investment Profile Score. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. Columns 1 and 2 include the full sample; columns 3 to 6 include observations with positive hydrocarbon production only.
reassuring that these empirical results are consistent with our
model.
VII. Conclusion
This paper uses a large data set of real-world hydrocarbon
tax contracts between IOCs and resource-holding govern-
ments to address two main questions. The first question is
why expropriations occur. We show that if there is incomplete
information about a country’s expropriation cost, expropria-
tions are an element of the optimal contract. We use our data
to show that most real-world fiscal contracts are nearly linear
with respect to the oil price. Although these contracts may
closely resemble the optimal contract, this linearity can pro-
vide a second reason for the occurrence of expropriations,
especially at high oil prices. The second question we con-
sidered is what determines how much oil price insurance
a country can obtain from these contracts. Our model pre-
dicts that countries with a high cost of expropriation and
limited hydrocarbon expertise can obtain better insurance.
We demonstrate that these predictions hold empirically.
We conclude that not all expropriations can and should be
avoided in the optimal contract. Nevertheless, the empirical
linearity of contracts poses the question of why parties do
not exploit their proven ability to use nonlinear provisions.
Section IV provides a discussion of possible reasons. Several
authors have commented on a recent shift toward progressive
hydrocarbon taxation (Johnston, 2008; Lovas & Osmundsen,
2009). This suggests that in recent years, the benefits of intro-
ducing nonlinear elements have increased, possibly due to the
recurrence of high oil prices and expropriations.
We show that the ability to commit to contracts improves a
country’s welfare. Therefore, we recommend that resource-
rich countries improve their commitment technologies in
order to reduce expropriation risk. Resource-holding coun-
tries can benefit from providing more recourse to for-
eign investors, for example, by signing bilateral investment
treaties. Such treaties usually include a clear description of
what is considered an unlawful expropriation. Violations of
contractual agreements with the IOC become a breach of the
investment treaty with the IOC’s country of incorporation.
This facilitates the seizure of certain assets held abroad by the
expropriating country. Commitment through the treaty can be
strengthened by including provisions that broaden the asset
base subject to seizure following an expropriation. Hence,
expropriation costs increase, allowing for more insurance to
be provided.
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APPENDIX A
Alternative Insurance Mechanisms
An important question is to what degree other mechanisms can insure
countries against fluctuations in oil prices. Potential mechanisms are oil
stabilization funds, explicit fiscal rules, and futures markets. These mecha-
nisms are likely to be less effective than insurance through IOCs, particularly
for countries with limited ability to commit to contracts. The reason is that
the costs of reneging on agreements, with either future regimes (as in the
case of oil funds and fiscal rules) or financial intermediaries (as in the case
of futures markets) are lower than the costs of reneging on contracts with
IOCs. Oil funds and explicit fiscal rules require self-commitment, and coun-
tries unable to commit to IOCs are likely to be unable to commit to saving
for future administrations. In many cases, they fail to deposit the budget sur-
plus in the oil account when oil prices are high. Oil futures contracts could
also potentially provide insurance. However, a similar inability to commit
applies to futures contracts: should prices move against the country, it could
renege on its side of the deal. As discussed, IOCs possess significant opera-
tional or technical knowledge that allows them to extract oil at a lower cost
than the host country can. This efficiency gain would be lost after expro-
priation, in addition to the other expropriation costs faced when reneging
on contracts with financial intermediaries. This makes contracts with IOCs
more stable and strengthens their role in providing price insurance to host
governments. Below we provide more details on problems with alternative
insurance mechanisms.
Oil Funds
Countries could use oil funds to smooth out fluctuating oil prices. The
prime example of such a fund is the Government Pension Fund of Norway
(Statens Pensjonsfond), the largest stockholder in Europe in 2008. This is
formally a government account at the central bank into which the govern-
ment pays the net revenue from hydrocarbon activities. It was set up to
counter the effects of the forthcoming decline in income and smooth out
the disrupting effects of highly fluctuating oil prices.
While there has been a recent increase in the number of oil funds, many
countries have proven to be unable to commit to this form of saving for
future generations. Furthermore, government expenditure is not effectively
stabilized by oil funds unless accompanied by expenditure restraints, since
resources are fungible (Daniel, 2001). For example, in 2000, Mexico estab-
lished the Oil Revenue Stabilization Fund to lessen the impact of oil price
volatility that had led to unplanned budget cuts in the late 1990s. However,
its congress decided to appropriate the stabilization fund and included it
in its 2002 budget, a decision that disregarded the rules regarding proper
spending of fund resources (International Monetary Fund, 2007). Gabon,
Kazakhstan, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela also changed
their funds’ deposit and withdrawal rules. Chad and Papua New Guinea
abolished their oil funds (International Monetary Fund, 2007). Therefore,
while oil funds may be very effective tools to insure against low oil prices
for countries with high institutional stability, it is precisely the countries
in which expropriations are a relevant concern that lack the commitment
technology to effectively manage them.
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Explicit Fiscal Rules
Explicit fiscal rules for the spending of oil revenues suffer from sim-
ilar commitment problems as the establishment of oil funds. Such rules
usually put constraints on the size of the nonoil balance, which prevent
large increases in expenditure when oil prices are temporarily high. How-
ever, adherence to such rules during times of high oil prices is rare. For
example, in 2002 Ecuador adopted three fiscal rules focused on the nonoil
balance, expenditure growth, and the ratio of public debt to GDP. These
deficit and spending rules were breached repeatedly. Growing political and
social pressures led to a relaxation of the constraints in 2005. Other coun-
tries that breached their fiscal rules are Azerbaijan, Equatorial Guinea, and
Venezuela (International Monetary Fund, 2007).
Futures Trading
A possible tool for oil-dependent countries to smooth the impact of oil
price shocks is participation in the oil futures markets (UNCTAD, 2005).
However, futures contracts involve counterparty risk that may discourage a
trader from entering into contracts with oil-dependent nations. To illustrate
this, assume that a country agrees to deliver 1 million barrels of oil on
December 31, 2010, at $60 a barrel. This insures the country against price
drops below that amount. However, should the oil price rise above $60, the
country has an incentive to renege on the futures contract and sell the output
on the spot market.
APPENDIX B
Proofs
This appendix contains the proofs for the propositions in the main text.
Without loss of generality, we set q = 1, g0 = 0 to simplify notation.
Lemma 1: Due to the risk aversion of the host country, y( pL) > pL.
Proof. Suppose this were not the case: y( pL) < pL . The country would
then receive y( pH) > pH and would never expropriate at high oil prices. But
for a risk-averse country, autarky (y( p) = p) would dominate this contract.
We can improve on this autarky contract by having y( pL) = pL + ε and
y( pH) = pH − ε for small ε.
Lemma 2: A contract that generates expropriation at μH will be
suboptimal.
Proof. If expropriation is optimal at μH , it is also optimal at μL . Conse-
quently the country gets y( pL) = pL . It would be possible to improve on
such a contract by paying the country y( pH) = pH − ε, avoiding expropri-
ation for all μ > ε. This would allow the IOC to pay y( pL) > pL . Due to
the country’s risk aversion, this contract would be superior.
Lemma 3: If renegotiation were to occur, there are only two undominated
counteroffers xi( pH) for the IOC, defined by u(xi( pH) − η) − φ (μi) =
u( pH − η) − μi for i = L, H.
Proof. First, it will never be optimal to offer more than what the country
would just accept at μL . Any higher amount would also be accepted but
would leave less money at the lower oil price, reducing insurance. Second,
the IOC would never offer less than the amount that the country would just
accept at μH . If it offered less, expropriation would always occur, and the
IOC would get nothing with certainty. This is clearly not optimal. Third,
the IOC would never offer anything in between the counteroffers that make
the country indifferent between accepting or rejecting the counteroffer at
a specific value of μ. The reason is that bidding slightly less would not
change the country’s actions but world increase the IOC’s payoff (and its
ability to provide insurance).
Proposition 1: There will never be renegotiation in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose μL is realized. By lemma 3, the IOC will never offer more
than the xL( pH) that generates payoff u( pH − η) − μL . Hence, the country
would be better off by expropriating immediately, without paying time cost
η for entering into renegotiation. Knowing this, the IOC would infer that
expressing an intent to renegotiate means thatμH is realized. Hence, it would
offer xH( pH). But then the country should deviate by choosing contract
adherence, again avoiding the time cost of renegotiation.
Proposition 2: y( pL) > pL. There are two possible optimal values for
y( pH), defined by binding incentive compatibility constraints IC( p, μL) and
IC (p, μH): (a) y( pH) is such that expropriations never happen; (b) y( pH)
is such that expropriations will happen only at μL.
Proof. y( pL) > pL by lemma 1. By proposition 1, we discard the pos-
sibility of renegotiation and consider only adherence versus expropriation.
By lemma 3, we know that u(y( pH)) ≥ u( pH) − μH . A contract that
always avoids expropriations must make sure that u(y( pH)) ≥ u( pH)−μL .
This would never hold with strict inequality, since reducing y( pH) by
ε and increasing y( pL) by ε would be welfare improving for a risk-
averse country. Hence, the optimal no-expropriation contract specifies
u(y( pH)) = u( pH) − μL . The other option is a contract at which
u( pH) − μH ≤ u(y( pH)) < u( pH) − μL . The first inequality will not
be strict. If y( pH) was set any higher, it would be better to decrease y( pH)
by ε and increase y( pL) by ε
πpH
πpL
πμH , which still satisfies the IOC’s par-
ticipation constraint. The country would be better off, since πpL (u
′(y( pL))
πpH
πpL
πμH ) = u′(y( pL))πpH πμH > πpH πμH u′(y( pL)).
Instead of only two possible values for the cost of expropriation, μL and
μH , now consider a discrete probability distribution over a finite number of
realizations of μ: Pr(μ = μi) = πμi for i = 1, . . . , N . There are only two
oil prices pL and pH .
Lemma 4: Again, the country will never renegotiate in equilibrium.
Proof. By the same logic as proposition 1, there will be a highest undom-
inated counteroffer. Even if the company offered its highest counteroffer
x1( pH), the country will never choose to renegotiate if μ1 is realized. It is
better off expropriating immediately and avoiding the time cost of renego-
tiation η. The IOC knows this and infers that any country that expresses
intent to renegotiate must have μ ≥ μ2, and will never offer more than
x2( pH). Hence, we see unraveling, with the result that no renegotiation can
be sustained in equilibrium except if μ ≥ μN , but in that case the country
would be better off adhering to the contract.
Proposition 3: If there exists a p in the domain for which Ve( p, μH) >
Vh( p), the domain of p can be divided into three regions. ∃p∗, p∗∗ such that
(i) for p ≤ p∗, expropriation will never take place, independent of the real-
ization ofμ : ∀p ≤ p∗, ∀μ : Vh( p) ≥ Ve( p, μ); (ii) for p∗ < p ≤ p∗∗, we see
expropriation only when μL is realized: ∀p ∈ [p∗, p∗∗], Vh( p) ≥ Ve( p, μH)
and Vh( p) < Ve( p, μL); and (iii) for p > p∗∗ , we will see expropriation
occuring independently of the realization of μ : ∀p > p∗∗, ∀μ : Vh( p) <
Ve( p, μ).
Proof. First, we need to establish that Ve( p, μ)−Vh( p) is weakly increas-
ing in p. The condition is equivalent to ∂u(g0+pq)
∂p − γ ∂u(g0+γpq+k)∂p > 0 for
k ≥ 0, since α − γp ≥ 0 by assumption 6’. By the concavity of u(.), the
condition is satisfied if ∂u( p)
∂p − γ ∂u(γp)∂p > 0. This condition holds for the
utility function in assumption 1, since u′(g)−γu′(γg) = (g)−η−γ(γg)−η =
g−η − γ1−ηg−η > 0 iff η ∈ [0, 1]. Second, note that at the lowest possible
price, p = 0, we find that
Ve(0, μ) = u(g0) + βVaut − μ,
Vh(0) = u (g0 + (α − γp)q) + βEp,μ[max(Ve( p, μ), Vh( p))].
Hence, Vh(0) > Ve(0, μ), which means that the country will never expro-
priate the IOC at p = 0. The result then follows from the fact that
Ve( p, μ) − Vh( p) is weakly increasing in p.
